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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the performance of the African Development Bank Group 
(AfDB) as advisor to African governments on Economic policy and planning. The thesis 
focuses on countries within the Economic community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). Ghana, a member of the ECOWAS countries, is singled out as a case study 
for the analysis. To perform the analysis, the thesis examines the purpose for the 
establishment of the AfDB, its mission as well as sources of funding and projects. The 
AfDB relationship with other multilateral development institutions, specifically the 
World Bank Group is assessed, in terms of the levels of capitalization and lending 
windows. To effectively guide what to measure, the Universalia model of organizational 
Assessment, developed by Professors Charles Lusthaus and Gary Anderson of the 
Department of Administration and Policy Studies at McGill University, is adopted for 
this study. Four factors were assessed: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and financial 
viability of the AfDB.   
This thesis concludes that the AfDB is an institution in the process of (re) defining its 
focus and seeking to establish itself among its member states. The AfDB has been in the 
shadows of the World Bank Group, the IMF and other multilateral institutions. Overall 
the AfDB has so far played a limited role in national policy dialogue with low visibility 
and minor contributions within the West African region. Moreover, in Ghana the AfDB 
has been criticised for being over-responsive to incumbent governments to the extent that 
it sometimes becomes inconsistent with the need for a firmer, more fundamental and 
coordinated stand in policy dialogue. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND 
1. Introduction 
This thesis is about the role of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) in 
facilitating economic development of countries in West Africa. It does so by looking at 
the advisor role the AfDB plays within the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) region, with emphasis on Ghana. Within international relations, there is a 
strong consensus that strong institutions are key to achieving economic development. 
Strong and well‐functioning institutions are credited with the promotion of growth and 
reduction of poverty by providing a conducive environment for implementation of 
sustainable development programs (Kumssa and Mbeche, 2004). Rodrik confirms that 
institutional quality performs extremely well as a parameter in explaining growth 
differences across countries (Rodrik, 1997). That is, the quality of institutions is expected 
to be essential to the success of ECOWAS countries' efforts to achieve long-lasting 
regional economic growth and integration.  
Political and social scientists such as Karl Marx and Max Weber have written about 
the relationship between institutions and development from different perspectives. 
Realists (eg. Mearsheimer, 1995) and liberalists (eg. Keohane and Martin, 1995) have 
debated the relevance and the (supposed) irrelevance of international institutions on the 
behavior of a state or group of states. To most realists, institutions do not matter in the 
international system; institutions have no significant effect on the behavior of states. On 
the other hand, institutionalists theory disagrees. Institutionalists argue that institutions 
do matter, that institutions can alter state preferences and change behavior. Besides 
political scientist and International Relations (IR) and development scholars, the question 
of the effect of institutions on development has also attracted the attention of economists 
(Coase, 1960) as well as policymakers  and international development organizations 
(Kaberuka, 2015), because of a growing awareness that the issue of institutions, good 
governance and sustainable development are interlinked (ibid.). Thus, as in the words of 
Keohane, states may fail to capture the potential gains from cooperation, unless some 
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coordinating mechanism exists. Institutions like the AfDB help provide such coordinating 
mechanisms. 
2. Historic intergovernmental effort to promote economic growth  
Traditionally, countries were on their own in terms of developing their economies and 
reducing poverty.  The first intergovernmental effort to promote economic growth and 
reduce poverty did not come into existence until after World War I (Gorman, 2001).  Of 
course, countries could rely on trade relations and the goodwill of friendly nations and 
investors from other countries to help it develop its resources, but these were mainly 
within the bilateral diplomacy of nations (ibid.). In 1919, the International Institute of 
Commerce, the International Labor Organization and the League of Nations were 
established. The League of Nations established a technical organization to deal with 
among others, economic and financial issues, health issues and communication and transit 
issues. In 1939 the League of Nations sat up a committee to study how cooperation 
between States could be more effective. That is, how the instruments at the disposal of 
the League of Nations for handling economic and social issues could be further developed 
and how the active participation of countries in solving these problems could be achieved 
(Reinalda, 2009). The committee recommended the establishment of a Central Committee 
for Social and Economic Affairs within the League of Nations.  The recommendation of 
the League of Nations was adopted into the United Nations recommendations and 
emerged as the Economic and Social council of the UN (ECOSCO).  
After the establishment of the ECOSCO, urgency for international cooperation 
increased from there.  Even before the inauguration of the UN, members of the League 
of Nations established the Food and Agriculture Organization (FOA), to enhance 
agriculture cooperation and development. Subsequently, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
were also established to help economic reconstruction of contries destroyed by the war in 
Europe (ibid.).  
In 1950, US president, Harry S. Truman initiated the establishment of the Expanded 
Program of Technical Assistance (ETEA), to supplement and expand the effort of the 
many specialized agencies and ECOSCO’s effort of economic development activities 
(Gorman, 2001).  During this time, a technical committee was added to the UN to enable 
the UN administer and coordinate the growing number of agencies involved in technical 
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and development assistance activities. An intergovernmental body known as the 
Technical Assistance Board was also created to provide governmental oversight of these 
activities. In the later 1950, the International Financial Cooperation (IFC) under the 
World Bank Group and the special UN Fund for Development were established to 
argument development assistance resources (Jackson, Davey and Sykes, 2008)1. It 
attempted to concentrate UN development activities. It is noted that poor United Nations 
member countries had hoped to establish an even larger and more endowed Special 
United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), but the rich nations who 
would have had to at the time finance the SUNFED were not enthusiastic about it. Instead, 
a scaled-down version of the SUNFED, the Special Fund was established as a 
compromise.  In 1965 this was transformed into the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP).  
2.1. The Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development and the 
creation of the African Development Bank Group. 
 
(Barnes, 1984) attributes the birth of the African Development Bank to the collapse 
of the SUNFED (P.151). The proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development was very appealing to the governments of the newly independent African 
countries and other third world governments. As a United Nations agency for all 
members, the voting power at the time would have been equal for all members2. This, the 
African governments believed could have provided them with a greater degree of 
influence than they would have had under the World Bank, where voting power was (and 
still is) contingent upon the volume of subscriptions that was drawn (ibid.). This in turn 
would have given the newly independent African nations a significant impact on the 
policy and investment decisions of the proposed Special United Nations Fund for 
Economic Development. However, the idea for creating a special fund was abandoned 
for the creation of a soft loan window for the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). Under this, borrowers were offered loans with zero interest rate 
and a 0, 75% administrative charge and a forty year amortization schedule (Goldman, 
2005).  
                                                          
1 The special Fund was established in 1957 
2 Today voting in the UN is a different story.  
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Governments from the newly independent African countries were not convinced 
about the World Bank proposal. The World Bank had shown a lack of strong commitment 
in addressing the needs of Africa, as demonstrated by the low level of financing in Africa. 
Between 1950 and 1961 Europe and Australia received more than twice the level of aid 
provided by the World Bank than the entire continent of Africa received from the World 
Bank (Barnes, 1984). This, coupled with the fact that the governments of the newly 
independent African States had to forego the chance of acquiring equal voting power 
under the SUNFED proposal in favor of proportional representation based on the volume 
of subscriptions drawn at the World Bank, fueled their dissatisfactions (ibid.).  According 
to Barnes (1984), the dissatisfaction with the World Bank proposal and the loss of 
SUNFED prompted African governments to look toward establishing their own 
Development Bank.   
Also, in the 1950s, with the emergence of the trends towards independence for 
most African countries, the concept of a development bank for Africa wholly owned by 
Africans which would invest in Africans’ development was very consistent with the 
political climate at the time. As a result the idea for the AfDB was formally proposed at 
the All-African People's Conference (AAPC) in 1960 in Tunis.  In an effort toward 
developing the Tunis resolution, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA) began a feasibility study for establishing the African Development Bank in 1961. 
The initial findings of the ECA were supportive of such a bank. The African Development 
Bank Group was then established in 19693. 
3.  Scope of the thesis.  
This thesis focuses on the African Development Bank as advisor to countries within 
the ECOWAS region. Specifically it focuses on the AfDB in Ghana. It is important to 
mention here that the success of a country or a region is contingent on different factors, 
both internal and external. Whether a country within the ECOWAS region is doing well 
economically or not, does not exclusively depend on the African Development Bank 
Group. The policies of the local and/or federal government, external influences, as well 
as internal pressures all contribute to the success or failure of a country. Therefore, this 
                                                          
3 The membership structure is discussed in the next chapter. 
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thesis can be considered to be looking at only a single detail of the bigger economic 
picture in West Africa. 
4. Selection of institutions.  
There are many international institutions operating in Africa today. However, the 
success of these institutions so far has been insignificant. The beginning of the 1990s saw 
a revitalization of African regional cooperation and rise of institutions in Africa. The 
transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) 
and the launching of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative 
in 2001 revitalized the old idea of a common Africa. In this thesis, I have decided to focus 
on one of the economic blocs recognized by the African Union as of this year (2016)4. As 
of today all West African countries but Cameroon and Mauritania belong to the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), this means that assessing the 
performance of the AfDB in West Africa is equivalent to assessing the performance of 
the AfDB within the ECOWAS region. In order to perform a detailed analysis, the focus 
will be on the AfDB’s effect on Ghana, a country within the ECOWAS region5.    
5. The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) 
The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) is a Multilateral Development Bank 
(MDB) that provides financial assistance to developing countries in Africa, typically in 
                                                          
4 As of today, the African Union recognizes eight (8) Regional Economic Communities across the continent. 
Namely, The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); The 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); The East African Community (EAC); The 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); The Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD); The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and The Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). One interesting observation is that, most of these 
institutions have overlapping membership with similar countries represented in multiple communities 
simultaneously (see appendix I).   For instance, Kenya and Uganda are both members of CEN-SAD, 
COMESA, EAC and IGAD. Likewise, all the member countries of ECCAS, EAC, UMA and ECOWAS 
are also members of CEN-SAD (see appendix for a complete list of membership for each community).  
Almost all the sub-regional organizations mentioned above have explicit economic integration motives, 
(Kerr and Wiseman, 2013).  I have therefore decided to focus the analysis on ECOWAS for the thesis.    
 
5 Note that the names ‘‘ECOWAS’’ and ‘‘West Africa’’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. This is 
because the West Africa region is the ECOWAS (with the exception of Mauritania, which withdrew in 
December 2000). 
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the form of loans and grants, for investment projects and policy-based loans. The AfDB 
comprises three entities, called the Constituent Institutions. These are: the African 
Development Bank   (ADB), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust 
Fund (NTF).  Together all three organizations are called the African Development Bank   
Group (AfDB). While AfDB and ADB have different operations/lending modalities, they 
share the same objectives, policies, staff, management and premises. Hence they are 
jointly referred to as AfDB. Each of the three constituent institutions (ADB, ADF and 
NTF) are discussed below. The point here is to provide you the reader a broader overview 
of the African Development Bank Group and its constituent institutions; why they were 
established, how they are finances and how the operate today. 
 
Figure 1  African Development Bank   Group 
 
Source: afdb.org 
5.1. The African Development Bank (ADB)  
 
The African Development Bank (ADB) was set up in 1967.  It is engaged in 
promoting economic development and social progress of its regional member countries 
(RMCs). The ADB’s shareholders are the 53 countries in Africa as well as 26 countries 
in the Americas, Europe and Asia6.  The main functions of the ADB as an arm of the 
                                                          
6 There are 77 members comprising 53 African (Regional) members and 24 non-regional members. The 
non-regional members (non-African Countries) joined in 1982, allowing the African Development Bank   
Group to increase its capital base. The Non-African members are Argentina, Austria,  Belgium,  Brazil,  
Canada,  China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands,  Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,  Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom and the  United States.  
The African 
Development Bank   
Group (AfDB)
African 
Development Bank   
(ADB)
African 
Development Fund 
(ADF)
Nigeria Trust Fund 
(NTF)
18 
 
African Development Bank  Group  (AfDB) are (a) to make loan and equity investments 
for the economic and social advancement of the regional member countries (RMCs); (b) 
to provide technical assistance for the preparation and execution of development projects 
and programs; (c) to promote investment of public and private capital for development 
purposes and (d) to respond to request for assistance in coordinating development policies 
and plans of RMCs. The ADB offers loans at variable interest rate, which is adjusted (up 
or down) twice a year7 plus a commission charge of 0, 75% (Trivedi, 2005). The ADB 
operations cover major sectors such as infrastructure, finance, agriculture and rural 
development, social, industry, mining and quarrying and the environment8. 
5.2. The African Development Fund (ADF) 
The African Development Fund (ADF) was established in 1973 and started operations 
in 1974 with the mandate to provide development finance on concessional terms to low-
income regional member countries which are unable to borrow on the non-concessional 
terms of the African Development Bank (Merna and Njiru, 2002). In accordance with the 
mission of the African Development Bank Group, the main aim of the ADF is poverty 
reduction in Africa.  The ADF’s current membership comprises of the members of the 
ADB plus 26 non- African State members.  The source of fund for the ADF is mainly 
contribution and periodical replenishment by participating countries. The fund is usually 
replenished on a three-year basis (ibid.). Total investment in the fund was 22.8 billion US 
dollars, prior to the commencement of the 13th Replenishment in January 2014, and with 
additional 5.35 billion USD agreed by ADF member countries covering the 3-year ADF 
operations from 2014 to 2016 (The African Development Bank Group, 2015). The ADF 
lends at zero interest rate, with a service charge of 0,75% per annum. It also charges a 
commitment fee of 0, 50% and has a 50 year repayment period for its loans. This makes 
the ADF finance projects and technical assistance the cheapest in the global market for 
African countries to access, especially those with poor credit ratings.   
5.3. The Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF) 
The Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF) was established in 1976 by an agreement between the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the AfDB, as a special fund to be 
                                                          
7 On January 1st and July 1st. 
8 See detailed distribution of funds in Appendix 
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administered by the AfDB. The initial capital of 80 million USD was provided by Nigeria. 
This was subsequently replenished with 71 million USD in 1981. The aim for establishing 
the NDF was to assist in the development of the poorest member countries among the 
African Development Bank Group in a coordinated manner. That is, the NTF uses its 
resources to provide financing for projects of national or regional importance that further 
the economic and social development of the low income RMCs. 
 
Within the African Development Bank Group, the ADB, ADF, and NTF each have 
separate and distinct assets and liabilities (The African Development Bank Group, 2015). 
There is no recourse to the AfDB for obligations in respect of any of the ADF or NTF 
liabilities. The ADF was established to assist the AfDB in contributing to the economic 
and social development of the Bank’s regional members, to promote cooperation and 
increased international trade particularly among the Bank’s members, and to provide 
financing on concessional terms for such purposes9. Dr. Akinwumi Adesina of Nigeria 
was in 2015 elected the eight president of the African Development Bank Group, 
succeeding Dr. Donald Kaberuka, who just completed his two five year terms in 2014.  
Within the African Development Bank Group, the president chairs the boards of both the 
ADB and the ADF. 
5.4. Funding of the African Development Bank Group 
Funding for the AfDB are derived from subscribed shares of authorized capital by 
member countries, borrowings on international markets and loan repayments. Its 
resources also come from the African Development Fund (ADF) and Nigeria Trust Fund 
(NTF) capital increases. That is, its resources are derived directly from special 
contributions from participant countries, especially non-regional member countries. The 
NTF derives its funding from the federal government of Nigeria.  It is important to 
                                                          
9 The African Development Bank   Group has actively participated in the establishment of five associated 
institutions. There are (a) Africa Re-insurance Corporation; (b) Shelter Afrique, (c) Association of African 
Development Finance Institutions (AADFI); (d)  Federation of African Consultants (FECA); (e)  the Africa 
Project Development Facility (APDF); (f)  the International Finance Company for Investments in Africa 
(SIFIDA); (f) African Management Services Company (AMSCO) (g) African Business Round Table 
(ABR); (h) African Export-Import Bank (AFREXIMBANK); (i) African Capacity Building Foundation (j) 
Joint Africa Institute (k) the Network for Environment and Sustainable Development in Africa (NESDA), 
among others. 
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mention here that unlike the African Development Fund, the NTF resources are allocated 
to both public and private sector projects, and not to countries. That is to say the NTF 
finance public and private sector projects that promote economic development and social 
progress among its RMCs, particularly the least developed. These projects are 
implemented and supervised by the NTF employees.  
As of December 2014, AfDB has an authorized policy capital of 66, 98 billion USD, 
most of which came from subscription by its member countries (65, 1 billion USD). It 
has 232 operational activities such as projects in infrastructure and sponsorship for 
capability building across Africa totaling 5,05 billion USD, financed as follows. 
 
Figure 2 AfDB Authorized Capital 2015 
Capital as of December 31, 2015 (AfDB) Million USD  
Authorized Capital   66, 980  
Subscribed Capital*  65 130  
Paid-up Capital     4 860  
Callable Capital  60 270  
Total Reserves     2 820  
* Paid-up Capital + Callable Capital  
Figure 3 AfDB approved operations, 2015 
AfDB approved Operations, 2015 Billion USD 
African Development Bank (ADB) 33 
The African Development Fund (ADF) 2 
Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF) 12 
Special Funds* 244,2 
Sum 290,2 
Of which: Billion USD 
Loans 3,89 (89 operations) 
Grants 613,9 ( 93 operations) 
Equity Participation 132,6 (6 operations) 
Guarantees 173,1 (5 operations) 
Special Funds* 244,2 (39 operations) 
 
Loans represent 3.89 billion (89 operations) of the AfDB approved operations capital for 
2015, Grants, 613.9 million (93 operations), Equity Participation 132.6 million (6 
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operations), Guarantees 173.1 million (5 operations) and the Special Funds 244.2 million 
(39 operations). 
6. The World Bank Group 
It will be unfair to discuss the African Development Bank Group within ECOWAS 
and Ghana without mentioning the contribution by the World Bank Group. The World 
Bank is the oldest and largest Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) in the world 
(Nelson, 2010).  It was established in 1944 to rebuild post-World War II Europe under 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).  Today, the World 
Bank functions as a global institution that fights poverty by offering developmental 
assistance to countries and by giving loans and offering advice and training in both the 
private and public sectors10. The World Bank Group comprises five sub-institutions that 
make loans and grants to developing countries:  (a) the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), (b) the International Development Association 
(IDA), and (c) the International Finance Corporation (IFC). It also has the Multilateral 
Investments Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Center of Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).  Like the AfDB, IDA and IBRD largely corresponds to 
ADB and ADF, and IDA and IBRD are jointly referred to as the World Bank. 
Figure 4 World Bank Group Structure 
 
Source: Worldbank.org  
                                                          
10 The World Bank Group has set two goals for the world to achieve by 2030: (a) end extreme poverty by 
decreasing the percentage of people living on less than $1.90 a day to no more than 3%; (b) promote shared 
prosperity by fostering the income growth of the bottom 40% for every country 
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6.1. The World Bank Group’s relationship with the AfDB 
The World Bank Group works closely with the African Development Bank Group.  
This is not surprising, the World Bank and the AfDB share the same mandate: to help the 
poor and promote sustainable development. The World Bank works closely with the 
AfDB both in financing projects as well as providing advice. For instance, a number of 
the AfDB’s projects, especially its policy loans, are financed jointly with the World Bank 
and other donors11. Sometimes the World Bank acts as the lead financier. In 2000, the 
World Bank and the AfDB signed a Memorandum of Understanding, outlining a strategic 
partnership between the two institutions to cooperate on a set of sectors/themes ranging 
from capacity building, governance, harmonization, HIV/AIDS, infrastructure, regional 
integration, staff development and water (worldbank.org, 2016). Due to its success, this 
strategic partnership was revised in 2002. It is still ongoing as of today.  
Aside from the World Bank, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) 
cooperates with other international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in capacity building and expertise in economic policymaking of African 
governments. For instance, the IMF is said to have trained over 3000 officials from 
African central banks, ministries of finance, economy and planning, and other 
government agencies within the past 20 years (Dessart, Ubogu and Kabbaj, 2001).  The 
IMF also cooperates with the AfDB on providing technical assistance programs as well 
as conducting periodic consultations.  A typical example is the Joint Africa Institute (JAI) 
which was established in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in November 1999 by the AfDB, the 
IMF, and the World Bank to provide African nationals with more opportunities to obtain 
training closer to their home countries. By establishing the JAI in Africa, the three 
institutions are able to integrate into the training program issues relevant to the region and 
to make fuller use of the skills of Africans. 
The above shows that the African Development Bank Group is not in it alone in Africa 
when it comes to spurring sustainable economic development and poverty reduction; 
other multilateral institutions such as the IMF also play a vital role. In fact, when it comes 
to external donations to West African countries, the AfDB provides less than 10 percent 
of total development assistance (Dennis 2006).  
                                                          
11 The AfDB often co-finances projects with the World Bank, the European Union and other bilateral or 
multilateral donors. In 2005, approximately 25 percent of AfDB operations (by value) were co-financed. 
23 
 
7. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
       The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established on 
28 May 1975 by the Treaty of Lagos in Lagos, Nigeria12. The mission of the ECOWAS 
is to promote integration in all fields of economic activity, particularly in industry, 
transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, 
monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters, (Ecowas.int, 2015). In 
addition to its economic objectives, the ECOWAS also serves as a peacekeeping force in 
the West African region13. The main institutions of the ECOWAS are the Commission, 
the Community Parliament, the Community Court of Justice, and the ECOWAS Bank for 
Investment and Development (the fund). The ECOWAS Commission and the fund are 
the two main institutions designed to implement policies, pursue programs and carry out 
development projects in member states (ibid.). Types of projects funded by the fund and 
implemented by the commission include intra-community road construction, 
telecommunications project and agricultural, energy and water resources development 
projects in West Africa.  
In 1994 a subgroup of seven member countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) established the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU), to allow them to use a single currency. Today the CFA franc 
is the common currency for WAEMU member States. The English speaking member 
States of ECOWAS are in the process of replicating this.  They are scheduled to launch 
their own single currency ‘the Eco’ within 2017.  The urgency to integrate the economies 
of West Africa has been linked to proactive advice from the African Development Bank 
Group which is serving as a key facilitator in this process (interview with Akin Alugbade 
2016). 
7.1. Ghana 
Ghana is widely considered a “beacon of hope” for African social economic development 
and by the African public as a model for other African countries to follow (Guder, 2009). 
Ghana is a republic located in West Africa. It lies between Latitudes 4° and 12°N.  It 
                                                          
12 The treaty was revised in Cotonou, Benin on July 24, 1993. 
13 On May 29, 1981, ECOWAS member States signed a Protocol on mutual defense assistance, in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone as well as a non-aggression protocol in 1990, to pave the way for the establishment of an 
allied armed force of the Community dubbed the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG). 
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shares borders on the West with Cote D’Ivoire, in the East with the Republic of Togo, the 
North by Burkina Faso and to the South by the Gulf of Guinea.  The merger of the former 
British colony of the Gold Coast and the Togoland trust territory formed Ghana. It has a 
total area of 238,533 sq km (land: 227,533 sq km, water: 11,000 sq km).  It has a 
population of 26 million, with a median age of 20, 8 years old (2014 estimate), (CIA 
World Factbook, 2016). 
In 1957, Ghana became the first sub-Saharan country in colonial Africa to gain its 
independence. After independence, Ghana endured a long series of coups before Lt. Jerry 
Rawlings took power in 1981 and banned political parties.  After a long debate, a new 
constitution was approved and multiparty politics were restored in 1992. Today, Ghana 
is a constitutional democracy, structured in 10 regions; Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Central, 
Eastern, Greater Accra, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, Volta, Western.  
Figure 5 Map references of Ghana 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2016). 
7.2.  Economic overview of Ghana 
Since the introduction of the new constitution in 1992 and the restoration of multiparty 
democracy, Ghana has enjoyed a relatively peaceful political climate with a stable 
democracy. It has demonstrated remarkable results in both macro-economic growth and 
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socio-economic development. In 2015, the World Bank declared Ghana a middle income 
country, lifting itself from a low-income status to a middle-income status (World Bank, 
2015).  Ghana discovered oil in commercial quantities in 2007. Since the discovery of oil, 
Ghana’s GDP growth has doubled.  For instance, GDP estimates for 2014 showed a 
growth of 4.6 percent over the 2013 revised estimates.  The GDP estimate for 2014 at 
current prices amounted to Ghana Cedis ₵ 111,436 million (US$38,584), with GDP per 
capita of Ghana Cedis ₵ 4,195 million (US$1,427). Non-Oil GDP for the same period at 
current prices was Ghana Cedis ₵ 106 902 million. In the next five years, Ghana is 
forecasted a growth of 6, 22% on average (Word Bank, 2015).  A summary of Ghana’s 
GDP indicators and the sectorial statistics are presented below. 
Figure 6 Ghana - Summary Indicators 
Economic Aggregates 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
Population estimate (million)  24,8 25,3 25,8 26,2 26,7 27,2 
Exchange rate  (USD/GHC) ** 1,53 1,83 2,05 3,03 3,39 3,82 
GDP Growth (%) 14 8 7,3 4 3,5 5,7 
Sources:  World Bank (2015). 
* Estimated by World Bank Group. **   Base on data from central bank of Ghana 
 
From the above, it could be said that Ghana is on a path to a healthy economic 
growth, even in the face of the current global economic uncertainties.  GDP growth is 
expected to pick up in 2016 after a slow down between 2013 and 2015. However, the 
country’s currency (the Ghanaian Cedi) is doing very bad compared to the US dollar and 
other major international currencies. This is, among other things, due to an increase in 
government borrowing and trade deficit meaning that Ghana imports more than it exports.  
7.3. Ghana’s relationships with external donors 
  
‘‘…It would be naive and unrealistic for certain sections of the Ghanaian society to 
think that the request for economic assistance from the World Bank and its affiliates 
means a sell-out of the aims and objectives of the Ghanaian revolution to the international 
community. ... It does not make sense for the country to become a member of the bank 
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and the IMF and continue to pay its dues only to decline to utilize the resources of these 
two institutions…’’ 
The above is a statement from Ghana’s first secretary for finance and economic 
planning, Kwesi Botchwey, defending the country’s request for economic assistance from 
the World Bank in 1983. Ghana has a long history with external donors. Ghana became 
a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 
September 20, 1957 (Worldbank.org, 2016). This was six months after it declared 
independence14.  It became a member of International Development Association (IDA) 
in December 29, 1960, and a member of International Finance Corporation (IFC) in April 
3, 1958. Ghana is also a member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which it 
joined in October 14, 1966 and April 29, 1988 respectively. The first major account of 
foreign aid to independent Ghana was the construction of the Akosombo dam. A 124m 
tall, 340m wide hydroelectric dam in Southern Ghana, constructed to produce Hydro 
Electric Power for the Aluminum industry in the country under Ghana’s first president 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. The project was funded by with loans from the World Bank, the 
UK, the USA and Valco, an American company (Berry, 1995).  Since then, Ghana has 
continued to enjoy the support of its development partners, both on a bi-lateral basis as 
well as a multilateral level.  For instance, in 1983, the government of Ghana launched the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) under the World Bank to help reduce Ghana’s debts 
and to improve its trading position in the global economy15. In 2001, Ghana joined the 
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative to relieve it debt and put its economy 
on track.  It is also important to mention that Ghana joined the HIPC initiative with advice 
and recommendation from the AfDB to do so. 
This has been paying off. For instance, in 2000, Ghana came up with an economic 
plan of growing its economy by increasing productivity in agriculture. Knowing that in 
many rural areas in Ghana most people live in poverty and minimal use of modern 
farming techniques, the government requested and received development assistance, 
including a $547m grant from the US government's Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC), toward improving agricultural productivity and food security. Ghana accepted 
the MCC's advice and recommendations, requiring partners to consult with citizens to 
                                                          
14 Ghana became an independent country on 6th March 1957. 
15 It also included lowering inflation through stringent fiscal, monetary and trade policies.  
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determine their constraints to growth and then reform policies and design programs to 
tackle them. The resulting improvements have been significant. In 2011 the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) calculated that since 1983, Ghana's agricultural sector has 
grown by more than 5% a year, helping to fuel the economy's overall growth (Leturque 
and Wiggins, 2011). According to the World Bank, the poverty rate in Ghana has been 
nearly halved from 51.7% in 1991 to 28.5% by 2006, and Ghana is poised to meet the 
UN millennium Development Goals (Coulombe and Wodon, 2007). Since the African 
Development Bank Group made electricity and infrastructure a major target, Ghana 
became one of the first countries to benefit from that. The AfDB has sponsored an 
expansion of cycle gas/fuel oil power plant from 220 MW to 330 MW combined cycle to 
produce electricity for rural communities in Ghana. The above may explain why Ghana 
is broadening its relationship with institutions within and outside Africa. These 
relationships are paying off very well, at least economically for Ghana as a country.  
 
 
  
28 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MODELS 
8. International institutions – definition, distinction and differences 
A distinct feature of modern international affairs is the large number of international 
institutions through which states seek to achieve cooperation.  Given the variety of 
institutions that are international in character, before analyzing the role the African 
Development Bank Group (an international institution) in facilitating economic 
development in West Africa, it is crucial to explain what is meant by international 
institutions. Different scholars have tried to define international institutions. The point 
here is not to adopt one or another of these definitions, but to ensure clarity and to 
distinguish the notion of international institutions as legal entities from the concept of 
‘‘international organizations’’ - the inter-state cooperation of the framework and 
structures of the international society. Social scientists and IR scholars define 
international institutions in term of their institutional nature. For instance (Krasner, 2009) 
defines international institutions as the ‘‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations’’. Duffied (2007) defines international institutions as a relatively 
stable set of related constitutive, regulative and procedural norms and rules that pertain 
to the international system, the actors in the system including states as well as non-state 
entities and their activities.  The United Nations (UN)16 defines international institutions 
as; ‘‘…established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and 
possessing its own international legal personality. International institutions may include 
as members, in addition to states, other entities’’ (International Law Commission Report, 
2011). 
This thesis adopts the definition by the UN, and classify the African Development 
Bank Group as an international institution. This is because the UN definition is the widely 
used in the literatures I reviewed. This will help ensure some consistency in this thesis. 
The African Development Bank Group as a multilateral development bank (MDBs) 
provides financial assistance to developing countries in Africa and embodies the key 
elements for identifying whether an entity is an international origin or not. That is, first 
                                                          
16 See work of the International Law Commission in 2011 
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for an entity to be considered an international institution it must be composed 
predominantly of states and/or other international originations17. Secondly, the entity 
must be established under international law.  These two criteria makes it possible to 
distinguish international institutions like the World Bank, and the AfDB, which are the 
subject of this thesis from international associations like international non-governmental 
organizations (NGO’s) such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace,  and international 
public corporations. The key factor distinguishing international or intergovernmental 
institutions such as the AfDB is that, International institutions are composed 
predominantly of states while the latter are composed of private entities, although they 
may operate in more than one country (ibid.). 
9. International Relations Theory and the study of International institutions 
In this section, I examine how the International Relations school of liberalism sees 
the role of international institutions for the behavior of states.  I do this by looking at what 
liberalism is and then focus on economic liberalism and liberal institutionalism. 
9.1. Liberalism 
Liberalism has a long tradition in International Relations (IR).  Since the first debate 
between realism and liberalism, realism mocked liberalism for idealism and as a 
consequence almost wrote out liberalism from International Relations theory. During the 
1960’s and 1970’s, liberalism was able to return into IR theory to make a real impact (van 
der Ree, 2014). The intellectual background of liberalism can be traced to the 17th 
century, the start of the cultural, economic and scientific changes in Europe.  The core of 
the liberal movement was three main ideas: reason, liberty and progress (ibid.). One of 
the early proponents of liberal thinking was John Locke (1632 -1704). John Locke 
believed that the state of nature does not have to end in violence; that individuals and 
society can rationally come together and find a common solution to their common 
problems. That is to say that free individuals can rationally achieve progress in society by 
delegating authority on elected leaders through a social contract. This means elected 
leaders will be made accountable for their decisions and risk being voted out of power. 
Another important proponent of liberalism was Immanuel Kant (1924 -1904). In his essay 
Perpetual Peace (Kant, 1957), Kant argues that human freedom and rationality can 
                                                          
17 Although, the membership may extend to other entities as well. 
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produce peace because an elected government will have no choice but to be accountable 
to the people. By this he hinted (or suggested) that it is unlikely for democracies to go to 
war. This is not primarily because elected governments do not want war, Kant argues, as 
governments may want war for all kinds of reasons, but because the general populations 
usually have very little to gain from warfare but a lot to lose from it and are hence 
opposed. These ideas are popularly termed in IR theory as the democratic or liberal peace 
theory. Besides the democratic peace research and theory, there are different branches of 
liberalism in today’s IR studies. These include interdependence, which focuses on the 
way trade affect peace. A third branch is institutionalism, which studies the impact of 
institutions on the state to cooperate and work together under anarchy. Other aspects of 
liberalism can also be found in for example the behavioral approach to neo-classical 
economics, where the main focal unit of analysis is the firm or the individual (Mahoney, 
2005).  
9.2. Economic Liberalism 
Economic liberalism or neo-classical economics has been very influential in most parts 
of the world in the last decades. Proponents of this theoretical strand argue that the 
economy should be as free as possible. That market should operate freely and an ‘invisible 
hand’ as coined by Adam Smith in his 1776, Wealth of Nations (Smith, Cannan and 
Lerner, 1937) will generally lead to welfare gain for all. According to neo-classical 
thinking, there are just a few areas where collective action will fail, and that is when 
governmental interference would be needed. This is in the case of market failures. 
Economic liberalist theory emphasizes the importance of comparative advantages of 
countries, where every country should focus on the production of certain goods or 
services that it can produce better and cheaper than other countries. All other goods and 
services should be imported as it is not rational to produce it locally. Proponents of this 
economic version of liberalism claim that if all states do this, and trade with each other, 
this will be beneficial for all (Mahoney, 2005).  Economic liberalism is largely a response 
to previous approaches that have emphasized the importance of government interference 
in markets, such as mercantilism which was dominant in Europe during the 16th -18th 
century.  
During the 16th -18th century in Europe, mercantilism promoted the importance of 
governmental regulation of a nation’s economy for consolidating state power at the 
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expense of rival nations (Hansen, 2001). It was this notion that economic liberalism 
opposed. In the framework of economic liberalism, economic interdependence is believed 
to promote the development of peaceful relations among states (Hegre, Oneal and Russett, 
2010). Economic liberalism has been very influential in most parts of the world in the last 
decades. However, in recent years, with the advent of the global financial crisis in 2008, 
there has been an increasing concern about the effects of economic liberalism. Most have 
called into question the core liberal belief in the benefit of open markets (ibid.). 
9.3. Neo-liberal institutionalism 
Neo-liberal institutionalism focuses on the role of institutions and regimes such as the 
AfDB, World Bank, ECOWAS and more recently BRICS in international relations. It 
studies the ways by which institutions and regimes make cooperation easier for states, 
focusing for example on the ways by which institutions provide states with information 
on transparency, consistency, durability and predictability (van der Ree, 2014).  Neo-
liberalism shares some of the main traditions of realism and neorealism. For instance, 
neo-liberalists adhere to the realist argument that states are the most important actors on 
the international scene, which act out of self-interest in an anarchic environment, and that 
states are rational (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997). However, neo-liberal 
institutionalism differs from realism and neo-realism in other ways, for instance, neo-
liberalists believe that next to states there are many other actors, trans-national linkages, 
and interdependencies between states that significantly influence the ways in which states 
behave and conduct their affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1977).  Neo-liberalists and neo-
realists alike believe that the global system is anarchic. However, states are not seen as 
the unit of analysis acting as cohesive entities but rather as being constituted by a range 
of different players. International institutions and domestic politics are believed to shape 
the priorities of governments and their behavior.  In addition to this, neo-liberalists believe 
that actors can cooperate across national borders. Private multinational corporations and 
trans-national interest groups all play an important role in influencing states to act in a 
certain manner (ibid.).  To neo-liberalists, international institutions set the rules, norms 
and principles that govern in a giving issue. For instance, as pointed out earlier, 
institutions are seen to provide information, reduce transaction cost, make commitments 
more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the 
operation of reciprocity (Keohane and Martin 1995).  
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Institutions affect the ways states define their self-interest. Cooperation between 
states is possible partly because of the existence of institutions and regimes and the effects 
of reciprocity (ibid.). Institutions influence states’ behavior. To measure the effectiveness 
of institutions and their impact on the behavior of states, institutionalists has developed 
models and framework to assess international institutions. One such model is the 
Universalia Institutional and Organizational Assessment Model (IOA Model), which is 
discussed below.  
10. Universalia Institutional and Organizational Assessment Model (IOA Model) 
Professors Charles Lusthaus and Gary Anderson of the Department of Administration 
and Policy Studies at McGill University developed this model (Lusthaus, 2002).  This 
model looks at the performance of an institution as a balance between the effectiveness, 
relevance, efficiency, and financial viability of the organization (see schematic diagram 
below). It posits that institutions’ performance should be examined in relation to their 
motivation, capacity and external environment. Lusthaus and Anderson claim that 
changes in these may lead to changes in their internal resources (e.g. financial, 
technological, human), and as a result leads to a fundamental shift in values within the 
institution, which in turn affect the climate, culture and ways of operating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Lusthaus, 2002) 
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Figure 7 the Universalia Institutional and Organizational Assessment Model (IOA) 
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Although there seems to be a little consensus in the literature on what constitutes a valid 
set of criteria for measuring performance in organizations, the IOA model above provides 
a pragmatic approach to assessing performance in depth (Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 
2012).  
The model provides a conceptualization of institutional performance on three different 
levels: the degree to which an organization fulfils its objectives (motivation), the ability 
for the organization to make use of its external environment (external environment), how 
the institution’s stakeholders perceive its performance (institutional capacity). According 
to Jørgensen and Laatikainen (2012), there are four core elements of institutional 
performance. These are: 
 Effectiveness  - the extent to which an institution is able to achieve its objectives 
 Relevance - the ability to meet the needs of its main stakeholders and gain their 
support in the past, in the present and for the future. 
 Efficiency - a ratio of outputs accomplished to the costs incurred therefor 
 Financial viability - the ability for an institution to raise the funds required to meet 
its functional requirements in the short, medium and long term.  
According to Lusthaus (2002), the above core elements can be further expanded and made 
measurable by identifying important dimensions and specific indicators. This model has 
been applied in numerous international studies, for instance, the Independent Evaluation 
Office of the IMF applied this model in assessing the IMF Performance in the Run-up to 
the Financial and Economic Crisis in 2008 (Lamdany and Wagner, 2011). 
Effectiveness:  Effectiveness is the extent to which an organization is able to achieve its 
objectives. That is, the extent to which the AfDB is able to achieve its mandate and 
mission. Following Lusthaus (2002), I define the effectiveness of the AfDB as an 
international institution in terms of the degree to which the AfDB has achieved its goals 
and objectives agreed to by the member countries: To contribute to the economic 
development and social progress of its regional members – individually and jointly.  To 
promote economic and social development through loans, equity investments and 
technical assistance. In theory, various standards can be applied when measuring policy 
advice effectiveness. For instance Laatikainen and Smith (2006), distinguishes between 
four different kinds of effectiveness: (1) effectiveness in acting collectively,  (2) 
effectiveness in achieving objectives, (3) effectiveness in contribution to the success of 
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other institutions of which one institution belong and (4) effectiveness in solving the 
underlying problem through the available means or networks.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, it is the third (3) kind of effectiveness that is of utmost importance, and therefore 
the focus of the analysis of this thesis.  
Relevance: Relevance in this case is defined as the ability of an institution to meet the 
needs of its main stakeholders and gain their support in the past, the present and for the 
future.  When analyzing the relevance of the African Development Bank Group in Ghana 
and West African countries, the thesis examines the background leading to the formation 
of the AfDB, the first few years of operations and how those challenges have shaped the 
AfDB of today. That is, relevance is constitutive of being able to talk about an institution’s 
performance in an understandable way (Laatikainen and Smith, 2006).  
Efficiency and financial resource viability. Efficiency is defined as a ratio of outputs 
accomplished to the costs incurred in securing that output. Financial viability refers to the 
ability of an organization to raise the funds required to meet its functional requirements 
in the short, medium and long term. The two criteria are related. As a result they are 
usually discussed jointly in the literature (see Lamdany and Wagner, 2011). Here, 
financial resource viability refers to the ability of the AfDB to raise the capital required 
in the capital markets to be able to finance its experts and advisors in the short, medium 
or long-term.  The resources required include finance but also personnel, as well as 
external expertise and knowledge of the member countries.  
10.1. Stakeholders of the African Development Bank in West Africa. 
The key stakeholders of the AfDB are the governments of Africa to whom the 
activities and projects of the AfDB affect and which affect the activities of the AfDB. In 
West Africa it is the member governments: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Togo18. Moreover, in recent years the AfDB has been directly involved 
with private sectors entities, for instance it opened a line of credit for UT Bank Ghana 
Limited in trade finance and sponsors PhD Programs in Nutrition in East Africa in 
Burundi (AfDB Project Portfolio, 2015).  In addition, various interest groups, NGOs (both 
foreign and African), think tanks and other organizations can be considered stakeholders 
                                                          
18 Note that I have not included Cameroun. This is because I want to assess the performance of the AfDB 
in ECOWAS as a bloc, Cameroun has withdrawn from the ECOWAS. 
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to the AfDB and are likely to represent contending perspectives on the relevance of the 
AfDB. For instance, several Non-governmental organizations have shown an interest in 
the AfDB’s development, its borrowing and lending policies, and the impact it has on 
ordinary African citizens. During the 2008 financial crisis, the AfDB president at the time 
was one of the first to be quizzed about the future of Africa economies in the face of the 
financial crisis (see The Guardian, 2008).  This is because the AfDB has a mandate to 
advice African governments on their economic policies, and different stakeholders 
expected it to perform that advisor role.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
In this section, I explain the core elements that are assessed in this thesis. These are 
Effectiveness, Relevance, Efficiency and Financial viability of the African Development 
Bank’s contribution to West African countries and Ghana.  The sources of data and the 
applicability of the data to the model are also examined. The method of verification of 
the data is discussed.  
11. Method 
In a democratic world, the legitimacy of international institutions is based on the 
process through which the institution functions (Wapner and Ruiz, 2000).  In other words, 
the process is much more important than the exact outcome. A good performance offers 
an accountable source of legitimacy for international institutions. However, a question as 
to what constitutes an institutional performance assessment still remains. Immordino, 
(2014), describes institutional assessment as a systematic process for examining an 
institution to create a shared understanding of the current state of the elements that are 
critical to the successful achievement of its purpose (2014: p.7).  Donaldson (2013) 
describes it as a systematic process for obtaining valid information about performance of 
an institution and the factors that affect its performance (2013: p.31).  Immordino (2014), 
outline that in any complex institution there are many things that can be measured and 
studied, but an effective assessment process focuses on those things that have the greatest 
impact on the way the organization functions. The key considerations which may guide 
the selection key areas for a  study like this are (a) time and availability of resource; (b) 
the purpose of the assessment and; (c ) the need to balance the interests of multiple 
stakeholders (Immordino, 2014).   
12. Scope of data collection  
To assess the performance of the African Development Bank Group as a regional 
economic development partner in West Africa based on the advice it gives to member 
states, on the four core elements of Effectiveness, Relevance, Efficiency and Financial 
viability, I have examined a number of initiatives financed by the AfDB as well as 
projects it advised on. This is based on the assumption that the AfDB will not sponsor or 
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advice on a project if it does not see it as aligned with and contributing to its general 
purpose.  
Finding data from Africa is difficult. In this thesis, the main source of data has been 
the Word Bank Group. The African statistical yearbook 2014 (and prior), as well as other 
international organizations such as aiddata.org and Transparency International (TI) and 
afrobarometer.org were also utilized. The World Bank collects economic data from all 
countries in the world. This makes it the most comprehensive source of most economic 
data. The African Development Bank together with the African Capacity Building 
Foundation (ACBF), African Union Commission (AUC), and the UN economic 
commission for Africa (UNECA) compile annual statistics of various economic 
indicators in Africa called the African Economic Outlook. The African Economic 
Outlook reports together with the annual reports by the African Development Bank are 
also utilized. These raw data is analyzed and interpreted in light of the four criteria of 
assessing performance. Data was further validated in a personal interview between the 
author of this thesis, Gilbert Kofi Adarkwah and Marie Laure Akin Olugbade in January 
2016. Marie Laure Akin Olugbade is the country representative of the African 
Development Bank for Ghana and chief officer for West Africa. Using the World Bank 
and the UNECA data together provides greater credibility and reliability than using 
locally produced data by the individual governments.  
13. Data quality issues 
Before I go further to discuss my reflection on my experiences with the data collection 
in Ghana and the African Development Bank Group, I find it important to mention that 
African statistical indicators, such as GDP data gathered by The African statistical 
yearbook, World Bank, Transparency International (TI) etc, as Morten Jerven put it ‘‘are 
of dubious quality’’ (Jerven, 2013).  Lack of quality and consistent data from African 
sources has created a legitimacy problem. For instance on November 5th 2010, the Ghana 
Statistical Services revised the methods and base data used to calculate its GDP and 
announced that its GDP for the year 2010 was revised to 44,8 billion cedi, as compared 
to the previously estimated 25.6 billion.  Which meant an increase in the income level of 
Ghana by about 60 percent. This rebasing was approved by the World Bank and other 
international institutions.  The World Bank for example reported in favor of Ghana that 
the rebasing of national accounts followed a review of the underlying statistical 
methodology by IMF advisors.  As a result Ghana was reclassified as a low middle 
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income country from its previous status as a low income country. Ghana moved from 
being a low income country to a low middle income country overnight. In 2013, Nigeria’s 
economy surpassed South Africa’s as the largest on African continent after it rebased 
Nigeria's GDP from about USD 270 billion to USD 510 billion for 2013. An increase of 
about 90%. As a result of the rebasing, Nigeria is now the 26th largest economy in the 
world (PwC, 2016). Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, all revised their GDP data in 
2013 (Sy, 2015). These revisions raises a lot of questions regarding the meaningfulness 
of using GDP levels as indicator for economic growth in Africa. The challenge for us as 
users of data is that, these inconsistencies and lack of quality which has led to the constant 
revisions of the data from the different African countries makes it difficult to utilize the 
data for comparisons of changes in economic development level. It raise questions 
regarding the meaningfulness of comparisons of GDP levels within ECOWAS and Sub-
Saharan Africa in general. This leave recent economic growth estimates and policy 
implication suggested boiled in uncertainty.  
14. My reflection from the interviews 
One year before my interview with the AfDB officials in Ghana, I wrote an e-mail 
to Marie Laure Akin Olugbade informing her about my desire to write this thesis on the 
AfDB in West Africa and if I could have an interview with her team for discussion and 
verification of the data I have gathered. She gladly offered me invitation to come over to 
Ghana whenever I was ready. So in January 2016 I travelled to Accra to meet with Dr. 
Olugbade and her staff. They were very welcoming. They were open to answer every 
question I had and even invited me to social events that the AfDB was participating in.  I 
was presented with materials on projects that the AfDB is monitoring in and around the 
ECOWAS region but particular in Ghana. The day-to-day running of the AfDB in Ghana 
was very professional.  
My impression was that Dr. Olugbade had all the data at her finger tips, even the 
less obvious ones i.e GDP growth rate across the ECOWAS region, Ghana’s 
Transparency International corruption perception score, trust deficit among different 
tribes in Ghana, among others. I was also given the opportunity to discuss informally with 
other staff members. Overall, I can say that the staff members where engaged in their jobs 
with the AfDB in Ghana and West Africa, however, they had little or no interest in the 
national policy dialogue of the country where they are stationed (in this case Ghana).  For 
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example, a few months before my visit to Ghana, world-renowned investigative journalist 
Anas Aremeyaw Anas published a documentary with audio and video evidences of how 
corruption takes place within the Ghanaian Judiciary set up in Ghana. Following that 
documentary, 22 circuit court judges and magistrates were suspended and 12 High Court 
judges were also put under investigations. This story was so popular that Al Jazeera news 
even did a special series about it19. During my conversation with one of the officials at 
the AfDB in Accra, I asked about what their thoughts were regarding the recent judicial 
corruption issues disclosed Anas Aremeyaw Anas. To my surprise, the official was 
unaware of the issue. I found it very surprising considering the fact that eradication of 
corruption is singled out as one of the main focus areas where the AfDB is advising 
African governments under the Governance Strategic Framework and Action Plan (GAP 
II) 2014-2018 (see AfDB annual Report, 2014) and also this judicial corruption case was 
the only thing the local media was focusing for those few months. I ask how long the 
official has been with the AfDB in Ghana. I was told she had been there for 6 years. This 
is not to say that she was not doing here job, in fact, she was very good in discussing 
projects under the AfDB control as well as the collaboration between the AfDB and other 
multilateral financial institutions. It was just that local policy dialogue was not of interest 
to her.  
 
  
                                                          
19 See Aljazeera.com documentary here: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/11/justice-151122124135186.html 
[Accessed 22 Feb. 2016].  
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CHAPTER 4 
 ANALYSIS 
15. Application of the theoretical model 
In this section of the thesis, the African Development Bank Group is examined under 
the Universalia model of organizational Assessment, developed by Professors Charles 
Lusthaus and Gary Anderson. Four factors were assessed: effectiveness, efficiency, 
relevance and financial viability of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB). 
15.1. Effectiveness of the AfDB in West Africa 
This section of the thesis assesses the extent to which the AfDB is able to achieve its 
objectives of: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; improve maternal health; achieve 
universal primary education; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; promote 
gender equality and empower women; ensure environmental sustainability; reduce child 
mortality; mobilizing and allocating resources for investment in RMCs; and providing 
policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts, in Ghana and 
ECOWAS region. The overarching objective of the African Development Bank Group 
(AfDB) is to spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional 
member countries (RMCs)20, that is, contributing to poverty reduction (Afdb.org, 2015).  
Economic development in this thesis is defined as a qualitative change and 
restructuring in a country's economy in connection with technological and social progress.  
Until now, the main indicators of economic development is increase in Gross National 
Product (GNP) or the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. Although highly 
disputed, GDP growth is said to reflect an increase in economic productivity and average 
material well-being of a country's population (Soubbotina and Sheram, 2000). Economic 
development is also said to be closely linked to economic growth, which leads to human 
development (ibid.). This in return facilitate the conditions enabling economic growth.  
This is illustrated in the diagram below.  Both GNP and GDP per capital relations with 
economic growth have been disputed a lot in the literature, but for the purpose of this 
thesis, I will adopt these to criteria because they are the most widely discussed and easy 
to communicate. 
 
                                                          
20 This thesis focuses on West Africa, which is only a subset of the AfDB member countries in Africa. 
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Figure 8Figure II: Economic growth and human development 
 
 
Source: adopted from (Soubbotina and Sheram, 2000) 
 
 
In the literature, there seem to be a large consensus that  economic growth comes 
in two forms; extensive and intensive. That is, an economy can grow by using more of its 
resources or it can grow by using the same amount of resources more effectively. Since 
the objectives of the AfDB is to spur sustainable economic development and social 
progress, this analysis looks at Ghana and West Africa’s (sustainable) economic 
development.  
 
Sustainable economic development 
Sustainable economic development is a term widely used by politicians and policy 
makers all over the world. However, as Soubbotina and Sheram (2000) acknowledge, the 
concept is still being developed and a definition of the term is still being revised 
continuously. This thesis adapt the classical definition coined by the United Nations 
World commission on environment and development (UNCED) in 1987. According to 
the UNCED, sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Lebel 
and Kane, 1989). 
 
Measuring sustainable economic development 
Different organizations uses different criteria in measuring sustainable 
development and classify countries into different categories. The World Bank for 
Means:
Economic Growth
Conditions enabling 
Human 
development
Goal:
Human 
development
Conditions enabling 
Economic Growth
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example uses GNI per capital to classify countries into low income countries and high 
income countries. Low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capital21 
of $1,045 or less in 2014; middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of 
more than $1,045 but less than $12,736; high-income economies are those with a GNI 
per capita of $12,736 or more. Lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income 
economies are separated at a GNI per capita of $4,125 (World Bank data 2015). Ghana 
has a GNI of $ 1 590, meaning Ghana is a middle income country.   
 
Figure 9 GNI per capital in ECOWAS countries. 
Country GNI per capital (USD) 2014 Income Group 
Benin                       890  Low income 
Burkina Faso                       144  Low income 
Cape Verde                    3 450  Low middle income  
Gambia                       500  Low income 
Ghana                    1 590  Low middle income  
Guinea-Bissau                       550  Low income 
Guinea                       470  Low income 
Cote d'Ivoire                    1 450  Low middle income  
Liberia                       370  Low income 
Mali                       650  Low income 
Nigeria                    2 970  Low middle income  
Niger                       410  Low income 
Senegal                    1 050  Low middle income  
Sierra Leone                       700  Low income 
Togo                       570  Low income  
 
Source: World Bank (2015) (http://data.worldbank.org/). 
 
 
The Gross National Product of a country is calculated as the total final output of all goods 
and services produced in a particular time period within a country. The Gross National 
Product (GNP) is GDP plus income received by residents of the country from abroad 
minus income claims by non-residents22.  There are two ways of calculating GDP and 
GNP. That is (a) by adding together all the income of the economy; wages, interest, profit 
                                                          
21 Calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. 
22 It is important to mention here that, this year Remittances from the African Diaspora, the largest Source 
of foreign financial flows to the continent, rose by more than 10 percent to USD 67.1 billion. Meanwhile, 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) was estimated at USD 55.2 billion, marginally lower than the 
USD 55.8 billion recorded in 2013. This decline reflects a trend that began in 2000. See AfDB annual report 
2014 p XI 
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and rent and (b) by adding together all the expenditure of the economy; consumption, 
investments, government purchases of goods and services and net exports (Soubbotina 
and Sheram, 2000). The results of both calculations should be the same (ibid.). In this 
thesis, the focus is on the GDP and GNP values and how they apply in classifying 
countries and assessing their economic development, rather than examining the 
calculation methods.  
According to Soubbotina and Sheram GDP and GNP can serve as indicators of 
the scale of a country's economy, but to judge a country’s level of economic development, 
these indicators have to be divided by the country’s population (2000: p12).  The GDP 
per capita and GNP per capita show the approximate income and amount of goods and 
services that each person in a country would get in a year if the nations’ income were 
divided equally.  However, it is important that GDP is not equally distributed. That is to 
say that, the use of GDP as an indicator for economic progress does not necessarily reflect 
the true situation at an individual level. For this thesis however, the performance of the 
country as a whole is the most important touch point for the analysis.   
Despite GDP’s limitations from not taking into account distribution of income, it 
has been one of the most popular (but also very disputable) approaches in measuring 
economic development in different countries. GDP and GNP are used as criteria for 
assessing economic development among the ECOWAS member states as well. I examine 
data from 1980 to 2014. Ghana and the ECOWAS are compared with the global average 
as well as countries under The East African Community (EAC), both of which are under 
the African Development Bank Group. The East African Community (EAC) is an 
intergovernmental organization composed of five countries in the African Great Lakes 
region in Eastern Africa: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The EAC was 
founded originally in 1967, but collapsed in 1977. It was revived on July 7th, 2000. In 
2008, after negotiations with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the EAC agreed to an 
expanded free trade area including the member states of all three organizations. Today, 
the EAC is an integral part of the African Economic Community. 
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Figure 10 GDP Growth among ECOWAS and EAC member states 1980 - 2014 
  
Source: Student Analysis, IMF Data- World Economic outlook 2015. 
 
 
From figure 6 above, it is safe to say that Ghana and West Africa in general Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth started on a slow pace, at least before 1984. However, 
since 1984 the accumulated average GDP group for Ghana and the ECOWAS region was 
6%, 5%, 4%, and 8% respectively. Ghana saw a negative growth on two occasions, 1982 
and 1983. Thereafter, West African GDP growth has been very strong, beating the global 
average (see appendix 1 and attached excel sheet for details). The average GDP growth 
for ECOWAS countries combined between 2000 and 2014 has been 3, 6%.  
 
Figure 11 ECOWAS countries GDP Growth 2000-2014 
 
Source: Student Analysis, IMF Data- World Economic outlook October 2015. 
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Global Average ECOWAS Members Avg. EAC countries avg Ghana
5 year accumulated Growth ECOWAS countries 1980-2014 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 Country Average %
Benin 2,3 1,1 4,8 5,1 4,5 3,8 4,5 3,7
Burkina Faso 1,7 5,4 2,7 7,5 5,0 5,6 6,4 4,9
Cabo Verde 6,0 5,5 3,9 8,4 6,2 5,9 1,9 5,4
Côte d'Ivoire 0,9 2,4 2,4 5,2 -0,8 2,2 5,0 2,5
Gambia, The 3,6 3,0 2,0 4,1 4,4 3,2 2,5 3,2
Ghana 1,1 6,0 4,1 4,7 4,8 6,3 8,2 5,0
Guinea 1,5 4,3 3,6 4,4 3,0 2,4 2,6 3,1
Guinea-Bissau 1,5 2,8 4,1 1,9 0,9 3,3 3,1 2,5
Liberia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -4,3 7,5 6,2 1,4
Mali 0,8 4,9 4,1 5,0 4,6 5,0 3,5 4,0
Niger -2,8 4,4 0,0 2,5 3,4 5,3 6,8 2,8
Nigeria 3,1 0,5 5,3 4,6 8,5 8,6 6,2 5,3
Senegal 2,1 3,2 0,9 4,5 4,2 3,8 3,7 3,2
Sierra Leone 0,6 0,6 -1,9 -4,7 22,8 5,1 10,7 4,7
Togo -1,7 3,7 -0,1 4,0 0,7 2,6 5,0 2,0
ECOWAS Members Avg GDP Growth 1,4 3,2 2,4 3,8 4,5 4,7 5,1 3,6
%
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Figure 12 EAC countries GDP Growth 2000-2014 
 
Source: Student Analysis, IMF Data- World Economic outlook October 2015. 
 
However, this is below the average growth enjoyed by nations under the membership of 
the EAC for the same period, which was 4,1%. Between 2000 and 2014, only two out of 
15 countries within the ECOWAS experienced a negative GDP growth (OECD, 2015). 
In fact, between 2010 and 2014, the ECOWAS countries grew on average 5,1% while 
EAC members grew at 5,9% (OECD, 2015); (World Bank data 2015).  This is an indicator 
that both the east and west side of Africa are growing.  
One can conclude that with regards to AfDB objective of spurring sustainable 
economic development, using GDP growth as the criteria, the evidence shows that the 
Bank has been effective at advising ECOWAS countries in steering their economic 
development.  In 2000 during the financial crisis, the ECOWAS countries grew 3,3% 
while the global growth was at an only 0 and 1%.  
The AfDB has succeeded in providing policy advice and technical assistance to support 
development efforts within the ECOWAS region.  
I must be cautious to state this, in the sense that economic growth for a country 
(Ghana) or a region (ECOWAS) is contingent on different factors, both internal and 
external. The AfDB has been functioning only as an advisor, which in practice means that 
its recommendations can be accepted or ignored at free will by the countries in question.  
 
5 year accumulated Growth  EAC members 1980-2014 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 Country Average %
Burundi 1,6 5,4 0,1 -1,9 2,4 4,4 4,5 2,4
Kenya 3,6 5,5 1,3 2,8 2,5 4,4 6,0 3,7
Rwanda 3,1 0,8 -9,9 12,9 7,6 8,7 6,8 4,3
Tanzania 2,0 5,1 2,5 4,0 6,3 6,1 6,7 4,7
Uganda 2,1 3,3 5,1 7,6 6,7 8,7 5,2 5,5
EAC countries avg 2,5 4,0 -0,2 5,1 5,1 6,5 5,9 4,1
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Figure 13 5 years accumulated GDP Growth: ECOWAS vs EAC member states, 1980 
2014 
  
Source: Student Analysis, IMF Data- World Economic outlook October 2015. 
 
Social progress - beyond GDP  
Beyond GDP, there have been discussions recently on measuring social progress.  In 
the year 1990, when the United Nations Development Program published its human 
development report, several critics came out regarding the methodology (Osberg, 2001), 
the criteria chosen and the indices (Banting, Sharpe and St-Hilaire, 2001), among others. 
The scientific literature on measuring social progress is limited (Stager, 1973), however, 
one good tool is the UN Human Development Index (HDI), which was created by the UN 
to emphasize people and their capabilities as the ultimate criteria for assessing the 
development of a country (UNDP, 2015).  Other commercial entities have taken it upon 
themselves to measure social progress. For instance, the consulting firm Deloitte 
produces an annual social progress index in which it measures social progress on three 
factors; (a) Basic Human Needs – comprising of Nutrition and Basic Medical Care, Water 
and Sanitation, Shelter and Personal Safety;  (b) Foundations of Wellbeing - Access to 
Basic Knowledge, Access to Information and Communications, Health and Wellness and 
Ecosystem Sustainability; (c) Opportunity - Personal Rights, Personal Freedom and 
Choice, Tolerance and Inclusion and Access to Advanced Education23.  Under this, 
                                                          
23 See Social Progress Index https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-
Deloitte/gx-cr-social-progress-index-executive-summary-2015.pdf assessed 19.12.2015 kl 18:55 
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countries are grouped into: very high social progress (i.e. Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Iceland, New Zealand, Canada, Finland, Denmark, Netherlands and Australia); high 
social progress; upper middle social progress; lower middle social progress; low social 
progress and very low social progress (Porter and Stern, 2015).  There is a strong 
correlation (0, 78%) between economic development and social progress. That is to say, 
at any level of GDP growth, there are opportunities for higher social progress and risks 
of lower social progress. Should one accept this, then considering the level of GDP 
growth in Ghana and within the ECOWAS region, there is a strong indication that the 
region is improving on social progress.  
15.2. Efficiency of the African Development Bank Group 
Efficiency as defined earlier is the ratio of outputs accomplished to the costs incurred 
therefor.  That is, the relationship between the goal achieved (effectiveness) and the cost 
incurred. Waste and government corruption has been a general theme of discussion within 
Ghana and among West Africa governments. A typical example is the recent arrest of 
Diezani Alison-Madueke, Nigeria's former Petroleum Minister in London, on charges of 
corruption (Payne and Onuah, 2015). 
The AfDB in 2014 sat up a Governance Strategic Framework and Action Plan 
(GAP II) 2014-2018 to help streamline its operations and cut waste. It is organized around 
three main pillars: (a) Public-Sector and Economic Management (PSEM); (b) sector 
governance; and (c) investment and business climate (AfDB Annual Report, 2014). The 
three pillars are supported by three cross-cutting issues (a) anti-corruption, (b) gender and 
(c) regional integration. In 2014, a total of 18 operations of 885 million USD were 
approved in support of good governance initiatives across 16 countries (ibid.).  One of 
the key areas of the GAP II program is Public Sector and Economic Management (PSEM) 
interventions. Under the PSEM, the AfDB works to strengthen governments’ capacity for 
transparent and accountable use of public resources and citizens’ ability to hold 
governments to account (AfDB Annual Report, 2014). Examples of such interventions in 
ECOWAS in 2014 included: (a) a 5 million USD institutional support project in Togo to 
modernize its Revenue Authority and increase transparency in the extractive industries; 
(b) a 12 million USD program-based operation (PBO) in Guinea for modernizing taxation 
and enhancing transparency and revenue collection from extractive industries; and (c) a 
2.3 million USD institutional support project in Sierra Leone to strengthen fiscal control, 
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accountability, and oversight  through various instruments, including support to 
parliament and civil society organizations (interview with Olugbabe 2016). In Ghana, the 
AfDB has invested heavily in strengthening institutions to fight corruption (interview 
with Akin Alugbade 2016).  However, despite all this emphasis on corruption, the misuse 
of public power for private benefit is rampant in Ghana and West Africa. In December 
2015, Anas Aremeyaw Anas exposed how judges were easily bribed in Ghana to set free 
convicted felons (Aremeyaw Anas, 2015).  
ECOWAS countries rank very low on Transparency International’s (TI) 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Since 1995, TI annually ranks countries by their 
perceived level of corruption24. The most recent raking is from 2014. It ranked 177 
countries on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).  With the exception of 
Cape Verde, all the ECOWAS countries score below 50 points, which indicates that all 
of them are to some extent corrupt countries. This could be explained by the fact that, 
although the AfDB has invested in institutions to fight corruption in government in Ghana 
and West Africa, the real implementation is in the hands of the local and municipal 
governments.  
  
                                                          
24 The methodology is based on expert assessments and opinion surveys. See http://www.transparency.org   
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Figure 14 ECOWAS countries ranking on perceived levels of corruption 2012, 2013, 
2014 
Country 2012 Score 2013 Score 2014 Score 2014 Rank 
Denmark 90 91 92 1 
New Zealand 90 91 91 2 
Finland 90 89 89 3 
Sweden 88 89 87 4 
Norway 85 86 86 5 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Cape Verde 60 58 57 42 
Ghana 45 46 48 61 
Senegal 36 41 43 69 
Benin 36 36 39 80 
Burkina Faso 38 38 38 85 
Zambia 37 38 38 85 
Niger 33 34 35 103 
Côte d´Ivoire 29 27 32 115 
Mali 34 28 32 115 
Sierra Leone 31 30 31 119 
Gambia 34 28 29 126 
Togo 30 29 29 126 
Nigeria 27 25 27 136 
Guinea 24 24 25 145 
Guinea-
Bissau 
25 19 19 161 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Korea 
(North) 
8 8 8 174 
Somalia 8 8 8 174 
 
Source: (Transparency, 2015) 
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Figure 15 ECOWAS countries perceived levels of corruption 2012, 2013 and 2014 
 
Source: Student analysis, Transparency International data, 2015) 
 
Inhabitants’ perception of corruption seems to be getting worse in West Africa. 
Most of the ECOWAS countries have a 2014 score worse than 2012 (when the olive green 
is above the red and blue bots, it means an improvement and vice versa). This is a sign of 
increasing level of corruption.  This raises a lot of questions; is the level of activation of 
resources devoted to fighting corruption under the Governance Strategic Framework and 
Action Plan (GAP II) 2014-2018 by the African Development Bank sufficient to achieve 
the policy objectives? In Ghana, the AfDB through GAP II has invested in the Ghana 
Integrity Initiative (GII), mandated to fight corruption. However, Ghana’s corruption 
perception score is still very high (lower than 50) while the total for the ECOWAS 
countries and Africa in general is worsening. Some blame this performance on the African 
Development Bank Group. The AfDB has among other things been criticized for not 
having a national office in all the member countries, making its projects and initiatives 
difficult to follow up on by its staff and experts (MOPAN, 2015). That is, the operations 
of the AfDB is inefficiently centralized, making it impossible for the bank to actively 
follow up on its programs (ibid.). At the national level, the AfDB’s perceived role in 
national policy dialogue has also been criticized as being of low visibility and of minor 
contribution.  This is perceived to be due to three factors (a) the AfDB not having an in-
country representation in all member countries; (b) the AfDB’s operations being largely 
project-specific; and (c) follow-up is not done in a systematic manner, whereby originally 
well-planned efforts lose impact.   
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On efficiency, taking corruption perception as the basis for measurement, the AfDB is 
not efficient in its use of resources. Resources are being ‘wasted’ simply because of 
improper follow up. 
15.3. Financial and resource viability of the AfDB 
Resource and financial viability include financial means, personnel and possibly other 
resources such as external expertise and knowledge etc. (Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 
2012). This means that in assessing the resource and financial viability of the AfDB, I 
must consider indicators beyond funds alone.  In this sections, I discuss where the AfDB 
gets its funds from, how much (financial) resources it has access to and how much it has 
disbursed. It is difficult to state categorically whether the AfDB has enough resources to 
operate effectively on advising ECOWAS governments or not without comparing its 
finance to other regional equals. In my interview with the AfDB officials in Accra, the 
officials acknowledged that the AfDB’s financial resources will always be a small 
fraction of Africa’s substantial needs. The fiscal pressures confronting many of the 
AfDB’s traditional donors are also challenging its capital flows. However, the AfDB is 
now looking at new sources of development capital from emerging economies and the 
private sectors, which are becoming more important for the funding of the AfDB’s 
projects and initiatives. 
AfDB funding 
When the African Development Bank  was established in 1964, under the 
agreement of Khartoum, Sudan, by the governments of Africa, the share capital was fixed 
at 250 million Units  of Accounts (UA) divided into 25 000 share of par value of UA 
10 000 per share (Fordwor, 1981).  In real monetary terms, the value of a share was 12 000 
dollars per share (equivalent to 91 000 USD in current value). The authorized capital was 
fixed at 300 million USD (approximately 2, 3 billion USD in current value). Subscribers 
to the Bank were required to pay 50% of the shares issued to them while the balance 
remained callable capital. When the AfDB was established, initially only (independent) 
African countries were admitted to become members of the Bank. However, as stated by 
the AfDB itself, due to growing demand for investments by non-African countries and 
because of the AfDB group’s limited financial resources, membership was opened to non-
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regional countries.25 As of 2015, the AfDB had 80 member countries, comprising 54 
regional member countries (RMC) and 26 non-regional member countries (NRMC), 
primarily from Europe, America and Asia (Afdb.org, 2015). 
 
Figure 16 African Development Bank top Donors by % of donations (2014) 
Country % 
Nigeria 9,25 
United States of America 6,07 
Japan 5,57 
Egypt 5,28 
Canada 4,59 
Germany 4,18 
Algeria 4,05 
South Africa 4,02 
France 3,81 
Morocco 3,75 
Source: AfDB Annual Report 2014. 
 
The main sources of funds to the AfDB is subscription by its members. AfDB 
funds are derived from subscriptions by member countries, borrowings on international 
markets and loan repayments (ibid.). Its resources also come from African Development 
Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF) capital increases. The role of the ADF is 
to provide the institution’s regional member countries with resources to boast their 
productivity and economic sustainability.  It is difficult to state categorically whether the 
AfDB has enough resources to operate effectively or not without comparing its finance 
to other regional equals. To do this the AfDB is compared with other Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDB) with regards to the commitment to lend. The table below 
summarizes the different lending windows for the MDBs, noting what types of financial 
assistance they provide, who they lend to, when they were founded, and how much 
financial assistance they committed to developing countries in 2014 or FY2015.26 
                                                          
25 Callable capital is capital that is subject to call only as and when required to meet the obligations of the 
bank on borrowing of funds for inclusion in the Bank’s ordinary capital resources or guarantees chargeable 
to such resources   
26 Data for the World Bank Group Includes IBRD, IFC, and IDA. 
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Figure 17 MDB Lending Windows -New Commitments, 2014 
 
Source: MDB Annual Reports. 
From the two figures above it could be said that taking individually, the African 
Development Bank will lend the least among the main Multilateral Development Banks. 
Lending only 6,9 billion dollars compared with 13,3 billion dollars of the Asian 
development Bank. This is a clear sign that the AfDB is less financially resourced that its 
counterparts. This has implications on the AfDB’s ability to finance development 
projects, especially those that require large capital investments like the building of electric 
dam and grids (see figure 2 and figure 3 above). To fully understand the difficulties of 
the African Development Bank Group to raise the much needed funds and lend more, one 
must understand the historical context and developments leading to the establishment of 
the African Development Bank group.  
Figure 18 Financial Assistance over Time 
 
Source: MDB Annual Reports. 
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The figure above shows that Multilateral Development Banks (MDB’s) financial 
assistance to developing countries has been growing since 2000. However, the African 
Development Bank’s assistance to its member’s countries is growing at a slower pace.  
The World Bank Group’s concessional lending arm, IDA, has grown steadily over 
the decade in nominal terms, while the regional development bank concessional lending 
facilities, by contrast, have remained relatively stable in nominal terms. One can argue 
that the World Bank is a larger institution than the AfDB with many wealthy donor 
countries. However, the same cannot be said as the explanation of the gap between the 
AfDB and the Asian Development Bank for example. The two banks were practically 
established at the same time, with almost identical foreign donors. With the USA, Japan, 
Canada and Germany donating to both institutions, the Asian Development Bank is better 
financed than the African Development Bank.  
Figure 19 African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank top Donors by 5 of 
donations (2014) 
AfDB % AsDB % 
Nigeria 9,25 Japan 15,68 
USA 6,07 USA 15,57 
Japan 5,57 China 6,47 
Egypt 5,28 India 6,36 
Canada 4,59 Australia 5,81 
Germany 4,18 Canada 5,25 
Algeria 4,05 Indonesia 5,13 
South Africa  4,02 Korea 5,06 
France 3,81 Germany 4,35 
Morocco 3,75 Malaysia 2,74 
Others 49,43 Others 27,58 
 
Source: AfDB and AsDB Annual Reports. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 CONCLUSION 
 
From the analysis of the data and interview with the AfDB’s officials in Accra, one 
thing is clear, the African Development Bank  lacks the necessary funds to finance the 
many initiatives needed on the continent and in West Africa in particular (see pages 45 
figure 16: MDB lending windows – new commitments).  This can be traced to the history 
of the funding of the AfDB. One of the most debated issues among African founding 
countries of the African Development Bank Group was concerning the structure and 
membership, i.e. whether membership should be open to non-African countries. A 
number of countries opposed open membership of the AfDB to non-African countries. 
This was because they feared that the non-African countries could end up dominating the 
institution by subscribing a majority stake of its capital stock (Barnes, 1984), due to 
history and the bitterness that many Africans still felt at the time towards western 
countries whom they considered oppressors. As one of the officials at the AfDB Ghana 
office put it ‘‘... this is not unusual… remember this was at the time when half of their 
countries on the continent were still under colonialism’’. The idea of inviting the former 
colonialists to participate in an African development institution meant for Africa shortly 
after gaining independence did not appeal to most African governments at the time.  
However, some African countries favored the idea of open membership. They 
emphasized the economic benefits of opening the capital stock of the institution to non-
African countries. That is, the participation of non-African countries would provide an 
additional source of capital and would ease the burden on poor African contributors and 
subscribers. They instead argued that the AfDB should be structured in such a way to 
ensure that African nations maintained majority shares (interview with Akin Alugbade. 
2016). With this argument in play, it was quickly realized that securing the necessary 
resources to achieve the objectives for setting up the AfDB meant obtaining funds from 
the capital exporting countries. However, some member countries were concerned that 
the AfDB receiving funds from non-African countries would interrupt the flow of 
bilateral aid they receive from such ‘donor’ countries.  This issue was so important to 
some members that at the Khartoum meeting in 1963 on the establishment of the Bank, 
the representative from Mauritania advocated the insertion of the word 'additional' 
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because a number of countries receiving such aid wished to maintain it without passing 
through the AfDB (Barnes, 1984).  
Aside the issues of funds, another major controversy concerned the formula for 
representation for the African countries.  The small (resource-poor) countries favored a 
one flag for one vote formula that would assure that each member had an equal 
representation in terms of votes, regardless of the number of subscription held by that 
member country.  For instance, at the Khartoum congress for the signing of the treaty for 
the establishment of the AfDB, Gambia argued that the proposed minimum subscription 
level at the time was twenty percent of its annual revenue and that the AfDB members 
should consider some other formula for assigning subscription levels (ibid.). As a 
compromise, large resource-rich countries like Nigeria advocated a formula of 
proportional representation which would acknowledge the larger financial commitments 
of those countries, while giving the smaller countries a voice. As a compromise 
resolution, a formula was agreed upon in the AfDB's Charter under Article 35 (1)  which 
states that ‘‘each member shall have 625 votes and, in addition, one vote for each share 
of the capital stock of the Bank held by that member’’ (The African Development Bank, 
2011).  With this compromise in place, the large contributors like Nigeria were able to 
secure greater voting power than under the ‘‘one flag - one vote’’ proposal.  However, 
their degree of power was not as great as it would have been under the proposal for 
proportional representation. With minimum subscriptions set at 1 million USD and 
maximum subscriptions set at 30 million, a member country with the minimum level of 
subscription would have 725 votes, while a member with the maximum level of 
subscription would have 3,625 votes. That is to say that under the agreed formula, a larger 
resource rich subscribing country like Nigeria would have five times the voting power 
even though its subscriptions could be as high as thirty times greater. This compromise 
was seen as providing for a more equitable position between the large member states and 
the smaller countries while allowing the large members states to make sizable 
contributions to the institution.  The tension between the large (resource-rich) countries 
and the small (resource-poor) countries has been analyzed by many as a sign of potentially 
disintegrative influence of imbalance among countries within the African community 
(Barnes 1984). On this, the officials of the AfDB in Accra disagree. They see it as a ¨ 
normal¨. That is ¨… it is normal that a country contributing more to an institution would 
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like to have a higher influence over the institution than those contributing less¨ (Akin 
Alugbade. 2016). 
According to the neo-classical economic perspective on regional integration, large 
disparities in size and resource among members of a regional bloc such as the ECOWAS, 
say Gambia versus Nigeria, is seen as a major setback to regional integration (FAO, 
2015).  Neo-liberalists has argued that when financial obligations are placed too heavily 
upon the poorer countries, the cooperative effort of the community can fail.  In the case 
of the African Development Bank, the ‘‘balancing’’ formula under Article 35 of the 
Charter helped ease the financial pressures on the smaller, resource poor member 
countries and calmed their fears of being dominated by the resource rich countries.   This 
paved the way for the AfDB to be established. The AfDB today has an open membership. 
However, it still lacks the necessary funds to finance the many initiatives needed on the 
continent and in West Africa in particular. 
Conclusion 
This thesis in looking into the advisor role of the African Development Bank 
within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region, has revealed 
that the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) is an institution in the process of 
defining its focus and seeking to (re)establish itself as a premier, results-orientated 
development institution with a comparative advantage for its African member states. My 
analysis and feeling from the interviews with the African Development Bank  officials in 
Ghana tells me that the AfDB overall has so far played a limited role in national policy 
dialogue in Ghana, with low visibility and a minor contribution (if any at all). For instance 
I had a meeting with one of the staff members who was not Ghanaian by nationality. In 
our conversation I asked about the recent judicial corruption case brought out by Anas. 
To my surprise, she was completely unaware of the issue. I find it very surprising 
considering the fact that eradication of corruption is singled out as one of the main focus 
areas where the AfDB is advising African governments under the Governance Strategic 
Framework and Action Plan (GAP II) 2014-2018 (see AfDB annual Report, 2014). 
Although, there might be variation between countries with regards to the contribution of 
the AfDB as an advisor, within the ECOWAS region, in Ghana the AfDB has been 
criticised for being passive and reactive. When the AfDB contribute to national 
discussions, they turn to be over-responsive to the incumbent governments to an extent 
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that it sometimes becomes inconsistent with the need for a firmer, more fundamental and 
coordinated stand in policy dialogue.27  
In Ghana, since early 2012, with the inauguration of the new government, the 
AfDB is described as having a positive policy dialogue with the government of Ghana, 
especially in the area of private sector development and finance.  During my visit to the 
AfDB offices in Ghana, I was made aware that in the early 2000s, several non-regional 
members expressed disappointment at the performance of the AfDB such as failure to 
engage with other development actors. In response to that, the AfDB initiated a 
commission led by former World Bank Vice President David Knox, to evaluate its 
performance. The commission drew attention to a number of problems areas, including 
poor quality of lending; lack of focus, conflicting interests of shareholders as well as huge 
discrepancy between official policies and actual practices.  The AfDB according to the 
Accra official has been working to correct this. They point to the fact that the AfDB has 
since become a signatory to both the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation and the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the agreement among donors to better align and 
harmonise their policies behind recipient country policies.  The AfDB claims these 
improvement initiatives have been showing positive results. As an example, the AfDB 
officials point to the AfDB’s triple A ratings (AAA or excellent credit rating), although 
none of its ECOWAS regional member countries enjoy that same level of credit 
worthiness.  In sum, the AfDB has come a long way beyond its role as a channel of 
development financing and has become a major economic policy advisor to governments 
in ECOWAS West Africa. This proves that, beyond the AfDB role as a channel of 
development financing, there is another critical contribution which African countries 
desperately need, and that is not resources, but policy advice support on how best to do 
things. 
 
 
                                                          
27 Neither confirmed or denied by AfDB Ghana officials  
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Appendix I 
1. List of regional communities in Africa can their memberships 
CEN-SAD - The Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
Members:  Kenya, Eritrea, Morocco, Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, 
Mali, Tunisia. 
UMA- The Arab Maghreb Union 
  Members: Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania. 
COMESA - The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
Members: Democratic Republics of Congo, Egypt, Burundi, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya; Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
EAC -  The East African Community 
  Members: Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
ECCAS - The Economic Community of Central African States 
Members: Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic 
of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
IGAD - The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
Members: Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan; Uganda 
SADC - The Southern African Development Community 
Members: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
ECOWAS - The Economic Community of West African States 
Members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone , 
Togo. 
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2. Accumulated Growth ECOWAS countries 1980-2014 
 
 
 
3.  year accumulated Growth ECOWAS countries 1980-2014 
 
 
  
5 year accumulated Growth ECOWAS countries 1980-2014 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 Country Average %
Benin 2,3 1,1 4,8 5,1 4,5 3,8 4,5 3,7
Burkina Faso 1,7 5,4 2,7 7,5 5,0 5,6 6,4 4,9
Cabo Verde 6,0 5,5 3,9 8,4 6,2 5,9 1,9 5,4
Côte d'Ivoire 0,9 2,4 2,4 5,2 -0,8 2,2 5,0 2,5
Gambia, The 3,6 3,0 2,0 4,1 4,4 3,2 2,5 3,2
Ghana 1,1 6,0 4,1 4,7 4,8 6,3 8,2 5,0
Guinea 1,5 4,3 3,6 4,4 3,0 2,4 2,6 3,1
Guinea-Bissau 1,5 2,8 4,1 1,9 0,9 3,3 3,1 2,5
Liberia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -4,3 7,5 6,2 1,4
Mali 0,8 4,9 4,1 5,0 4,6 5,0 3,5 4,0
Niger -2,8 4,4 0,0 2,5 3,4 5,3 6,8 2,8
Nigeria 3,1 0,5 5,3 4,6 8,5 8,6 6,2 5,3
Senegal 2,1 3,2 0,9 4,5 4,2 3,8 3,7 3,2
Sierra Leone 0,6 0,6 -1,9 -4,7 22,8 5,1 10,7 4,7
Togo -1,7 3,7 -0,1 4,0 0,7 2,6 5,0 2,0
ECOWAS Members Avg GDP Growth 1,4 3,2 2,4 3,8 4,5 4,7 5,1 3,6
5 year accumulated Growth  EAC members 1980-2014 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 Country Average %
Burundi 1,6 5,4 0,1 -1,9 2,4 4,4 4,5 2,4
Kenya 3,6 5,5 1,3 2,8 2,5 4,4 6,0 3,7
Rwanda 3,1 0,8 -9,9 12,9 7,6 8,7 6,8 4,3
Tanzania 2,0 5,1 2,5 4,0 6,3 6,1 6,7 4,7
Uganda 2,1 3,3 5,1 7,6 6,7 8,7 5,2 5,5
EAC countries avg 2,5 4,0 -0,2 5,1 5,1 6,5 5,9 4,1
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4. Overview of MDB Lending Windows 
 
  
Name Type of Financing Type of Borrower Year Founded
New Commitments, 
2014 or FY2015 (Billion $)
World Bank Group*
International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD)
Non-concessional
loans and loan
guarantees
Primarily middle-income
governments, also some
creditworthy low-income
countries
1944 23,53
International Development
Association (IDA)
Concessional loans
and grants
Low-income governments 1960 19,00
International Finance
Corporation (IFC)
Non-concessional
loans, equity
investments, and loan
guarantees
Private sector firms in
developing countries
(middle- and low-income
countries)
1956 10,58
African Development Bank (AfDB)
Non-concessional
loans, equity  investments, and 
loan guarantees
Middle-income governments,
some creditworthy lowincome
governments, and  private sector firms 
in the region
1964 4,64
African Development Fund (AfDF)
Concessional loans
and grants
Low-income governments in
the region
1972 2,30
Asian Development Bank (AsDB)
Non-concessional
loans, equity
investments, and loan
guarantees
Middle-income governments,
some creditworthy lowincome
governments, and private sector firms 
in the region
1966 10,23
Asian Development Fund (AsDF) Concessional loans
and grants
Low-income governments in
the region
1973 3,09
European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development 
(EBRD)
Non-concessional loans equity 
investments, and loan 
guarantees
Primarily private sector firms
in developing countries in
the region, also developingcountry
governments in the region
1991 10,75
Inter-American Development Bank
 (IDB)
Non-concessional
loans and loan
guarantees
Middle-income governments,
some creditworthy lowincome
governments, and private sector firms 
in the region
1959 12,65
Fund for Special Operations (FSO) Concessional loans
Low-income governments in
the region
1959
0,30
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Appendix II 
1. AfDB Group Operations revenue , 2014/2015 
 
Year Revenue   
2015 6,94 Billion USD 
2014 5,05 Billion USD 
2013 4,39 Billion USD 
2012 4,25 Billion USD 
2011 5,72 Billion USD 
2010 39,9 Billion USD 
 
 
 
2. AfDB Loan and Grant Approvals by Sector, 2014/2015 
Sector USD % 
Infrastructure        2 500 000 000  55,5 % 
Finance           806 800 000  17,9 % 
Agriculture and Rural Development           488 300 000  10,8 % 
Social           366 900 000  8,2 % 
Multi-sector           267 400 000  5,9 % 
Industry, mining and quarrying             39 100 000  0,9 % 
Environment             33 200 000  0,7 % 
Sum        4 501 700 000  100 % 
 
3. Authorized Capital, 2015 
Capital as of December 31, 2015 (AfDB) USD 
Authorized Capital   66 980 000 000  
Subscribed Capital  65 130 000 000  
Paid-up Capital     4 860 000 000  
Callable Capital  60 270 000 000  
Total Reserves     2 820 000 000  
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